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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the impact of online participation platforms on the internal organization 
and democracy of a set of emerging political parties such as the Five Star Movement, Podemos, France 
Insoumise, the Pirate Parties and Barcelona en Comu. Taking cue from the recent publication of Paolo 
Gerbaudo’s book The Digital Party, the article argues that digital parties can be divided in two ideal party 
types: the platform party and the networked party. Whereas the platform party is highly centralized, led 
by a charismatic leader, and strictly focused on the electoral competition, the networked party is a more 
decentralized ideal party type, which allows policy proposals and leadership positions emerge from the 
network itself. The article concludes by noting that while it would be easy to cast these two variants of the 
digital party as an alternative between political realism, both types of parties face symmetrical challenges 
such as how to move beyond plebiscitarian consultations and how to scale deliberation from the local level 
to the national level.  
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1. Introduction 
  
Over the past twenty years, a few political scientists and communication scholars 
have investigated the impact of digital media on the internal organization of political 
parties, identifying in some cases new party types such as the cyber-party (Margetts 
2006) and the digital party (Gerbaudo 2019). The reason for which this strand of litera-
ture is significantly less developed than the political communication scholarship largely 
depends on the object of study: whereas most parties use digital media for campaign-
ing and reaching out to constituents only a few parties make a thorough use of digital 
media for organizing and decision-making purposes. Over the past decade, however, 
emerging European parties such as the Pirate Parties of Sweden, Germany and Iceland, 
the Five Star Movement in Italy, the France Insoumise in France, and Podemos in Spain 
have leveraged the affordances of digital media to cut organizational costs and experi-
ment with new forms of participation and intra-party democracy.  
Taking note of this recent trend, Paolo Gerbaudo‘s monograph The Digital Party: Po-
litical Organisation and Online Democracy (2019) argues that these emerging parties 
epitomize a new type of party organization, which would replace historical party mod-
els such as the mass party, the catch-all party, and the cartel party. According to 
Gerbaudo, digital parties such as Podemos, France Insoumise and Five Star Movement 
(from now on, 5SM) represent an antidote to the historical decline of party member-
ship in mature democracies. They also ostensibly endow their members with more 
power than traditional parties, allowing them to participate in binding consultations, 
contribute to the drafting of the party program, and propose their own policy initia-
tives. Such innovations are possible because all digital parties share—and hence are 
defined by—one major organizational feature: the use of online participation plat-
forms. Because the importance of these platforms cannot be overstated, throughout 
the book digital party is used interchangeably with platform party—an expression that 
titles an abridged Italian version of the book, Il Partito Piattaforma (2018).  
Thus the focus on platforms allows Gerbaudo to distinguish between parties that 
generically use the Internet for political communication and the digital parties proper, 
which rely on their own participation platforms for internal decision-making and organ-
ization (2019: 68). Whereas digital platforms such as Rousseau (5SM), Participa (Po-
demos), NationBuilder (France Insoumise) and MyMomentum (Momentum – Labour 
Party) promise to empower the rank and file and improve on the quality of intra-party 
democracy (IPD) Gerbaudo argues that in actuality platform parties bring about a type 
of “reactive democracy,” whereby ordinary members have no control over the party 
agenda and mostly respond to top-down consultations (2019: 17). However, he also 
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surmises that the gap between promise and reality could be filled with few correctives 
(190-192).  
Striking a less optimistic tone, this article will argue that the platformization of par-
ties goes hand in hand with two organizational processes that long precede the Inter-
net: centralization and personalization. After highlighting several organizational conti-
nuities between the platform party and previous party models—such as the cartel par-
ty and the personalist parties of the television age—the article contrasts the central-
ized organization of the platform party to the decentralized organization of a different 
variant of digital party, the networked party. Under this definition, I group technocratic 
parties such as the Pirate Parties of Sweden, Germany and Iceland as well as move-
ment parties such as Barcelona en Comú and the X Party in Spain. Similar to platform 
parties, networked parties adopt participation platforms for drafting program and poli-
cy proposals. But unlike platform parties, networked parties allow members to partici-
pate in various stages of the decision-making process, from setting the agenda to de-
liberation and voting. Further, as we will see, leadership positions in networked parties 
tend to emerge from a bottom-up division of labor, rather than top-down appoint-
ments of the party elite.  
Thus, on an ideal party level, the networked party seems to offer a higher quality of 
IPD than the platform party.1 Gerbaudo, however, tends to identify the digital party 
with the platform party. The aim of this article is to show that although all digital par-
ties carry the promise of democratizing party politics (insofar as they ostensibly em-
power ordinary party members via digital platforms) only some digital parties, the net-
worked parties, have actually tried to deliver on this promise. This difference will be 
explained with the different relationship networked parties entertain with digital tech-
nologies on the one hand and with social movements on the other hand. Before com-
paring the two variants of the digital party, I will review The Digital Party’s main theses, 
beginning from an analysis of the analogies and differences between social media plat-
forms and the platforms managed by digital parties.  
 
 
1 The debate on IPD is too complex to be summarized in this article. Here it suffices to 
say that whereas political scientists have long considered oligarchic rule and internal 
party cohesion as necessary and even desirable conditions of representative democra-
cy, a more recent orientation grounded in participatory and deliberative theories of 
democracy sees IPD as beneficial to state-level democracy. Gerbaudo’s book (and this 
article) implicitly build on the latter insofar as all digital parties ostensibly afford ordi-
nary members decision-making powers that traditional parties do not afford.  
Author: Marco Deseriis, Title: Two Variants of the Digital Party 
 
899 
 
2. Platform Politics in Platform Parties 
  
The Digital Party is divided into nine chapters, but the book advances seven key the-
ses concerning the organization of the platform party, which can be summarized as fol-
lows: membership growth, delocalization, hyperleadership, superbase, plebiscitarian-
ism, disintermediation, and distributed centralization. Thus the main merit of the book 
is to have introduced a new vocabulary, which grasps the emergence of important or-
ganizational innovations in political parties. At the same time, the emphasis on the new 
risks to cloud the many continuities that exist between the digital party and previous 
party models.  
Such obfuscation occurs because Gerbaudo does not sufficiently explore the ambiva-
lent nature of digital platforms, which lower on the one hand the costs of participation 
but increase on the other hand centralized control. In computational terms platforms 
are essentially defined by their programmability and APIs, which allow for the devel-
opment of third-party applications (McKelvey 2011). Besides marking a shift from the 
Web 1.0 to the Web 2.0 (O’Reilly 2005), the programmability of social media platforms 
allows for the decentralization of data production and recentralization of data pro-
cessing (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013). This dual logic of platformization is evident, for 
example, from the way Facebook uses its social plug-ins “for collecting and formatting 
external web data to fit the underlying logic of the platform” (Helmond 2015: 8). Most 
importantly, data collection and data extraction create significantly more value for 
platform owners than for platform users (Zuboff 2019).   
To what extent is the double logic of platformization in line with the emerging or-
ganization of the digital party? Gerbaudo’s answer to this question is unequivocal. Not 
only does the digital party make an intensive use of social media, but models its organ-
ization after social media platforms, from constantly eliciting feedback from members 
and sympathizers to adopting the  
  
free sign-up process of social media and apps, to lower as much as possible the bar-
rier to entry and its definition of membership. . . . In other words, the digital party is 
the translation of the business model and organisational innovation of digital corpo-
rations to the political arena and their application to the idealistic project of the 
construction of a new democracy in digital times (2019: 5-6). 
  
Whereas Gerbaudo’s analogy is suggestive, it is also partly misleading. Certainly, sim-
ilar to digital corporations, digital parties encourage member feedback and have an in-
terest in growing their member-user base. But unlike digital corporations, digital par-
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ties do not sustain such growth by extracting and selling users’ data. This is because 
digital parties occupy the position of suppliers—not that of intermediaries—within the 
marketplace of political ideas. It follows that digital parties must first and foremost 
control the consistency of their message. This means, in turn, that they cannot open 
themselves up to uncontrolled third-party contributions neither semantically nor oper-
ationally. Second, because digital parties cannot systematically track their members 
without breaking the law, the analytic value of the data they collect via their participa-
tion platforms is infinitely lower than the value social media platforms extract from the 
habits and interests of millions of users (Karpf 2018). 
These two elements—the non-neutrality of parties and the low analytic value of 
member data—suggest that the process of platformization of political parties is not a 
“translation of the business model and organizational innovation of digital corporations 
to the political arena” (Gerbaudo, 6), at least not a linear one. At the same time, the 
fact that political parties are not profit-oriented organizations does not mean that they 
cannot borrow some organizational principles from digital platforms—and the free 
subscription model is certainly one of them. Further by centralizing political processes 
that were previously managed by different branches and compartments of party or-
ganizations, participation platforms primarily empower those who control them—that 
is, the party elite—rather than the ordinary member-users. To be fair, the tension be-
tween what members gain from joining a digital party and what they give away surfac-
es at different turns of The Digital Party. But this bargain is not framed as an unequal 
exchange. Rather the seven organizational principles that undergird the digital party 
model suggest that the party elite and the party base are both empowered at the ex-
pense of intermediary cadres. As we will see, the empowerment of the base via digital 
platforms conceals in fact a redefinition of the base as an atomized collection of indi-
viduals, and thus the constitution of a new organizational layer, which replaces and 
disempowers the organized party on the ground. But before deepening this point, we 
shall first review the main arguments of the book. 
 
 
3. The Digital Party’s Seven Theses 
  
First, Gerbaudo argues that by adopting the free registration model of social media 
platforms digital parties such as the 5SM, Podemos and France Insoumise have quickly 
grown sizeable memberships, which stand in stark contrast and possibly counteract the 
historical decline of party membership in mature democracies (23). Second, participa-
tion platforms such as Rousseau (5SM), Participa (Podemos), NationBuilder (France In-
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soumise) and MyMomentum (Momentum – Labour Party) allow parties to delocalize 
political decisions, which are no longer attached to local party branches or national 
party headquarters (92-104). Third, platform parties are conducive to the rise of char-
ismatic “hyperleaders,” whose name and image spread through digital networks in a 
variety of media formats including videos, hashtags, and memes (144-61). Fourth, the 
charisma of the hyperleader is counterbalanced by the party “superbase,” a term 
Gerbaudo borrows from chemistry to refer to a “super-basic compound… that has high 
reactivity to protons” (162). Similarly, the digital base of party members and party sup-
porters is reactive in that it responds to calls coming from the party leadership to par-
ticipate in consultations and campaigns (162-76).  
Fifth, if it is true that the superbase is frequently consulted on key decisions, the tim-
ing and framing of consultations is controlled by the party leadership, which often uses 
them to legitimize its own position. This is what Gerbaudo calls “plebiscitarianism 2.0” 
(126-43). Sixth, similar to commercial platforms such as Amazon, Airbnb, and Uber, 
platform parties render many middlemen unnecessary, accelerating the decline or dis-
appearance of the party middle-elite (69-73). Along with the abandonment of collegial 
decision-making bodies, the decline of intermediary cadres produces a party model 
wherein the relationship between the hyperleader and the superbase is direct and un-
mediated. However, “the discourse of disintermediation belies a reality of reinterme-
diation in which doing away with previous forms of mediation is accompanied by the 
construction of higher-level mediations” (76). Such higher-level mediations are em-
bedded in the software architecture of participation platforms, which inevitably shape 
the internal organization and democracy of digital parties (105-25). Far from being neu-
tral, and this is the seventh thesis, the design of this architecture follows a principle of 
“distributed centralization,” which Gerbaudo defines as “a process of organisational 
polarisation that empowers both the leadership and ordinary members at the expense 
of the cadres and the bureaucracy” (76). 
Here Gerbaudo draws on the work of Becky Bond and Zack Exley (2016), two staffers 
at the 2016 Bernie Sanders’ campaign for the US presidential primaries, to argue that 
while the digital party is open and flexible in mobilizing members and sympathizers, it 
also implements a centralized strategy, which is executed through the maintenance 
and querying of  centralized databases of members whereby a variety of skills and 
competences can be activated (Gerbaudo, 76). Bond and Exley also note that the effi-
ciency of participation platforms enables a core staff of “super-volunteers” to coordi-
nate remotely a high number of activities (Gerbaudo, 171-173). In contrast, according 
to Gerbaudo, the ordinary member is reduced to a “lurking supporter” whose sporadic 
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participation in party consultations and online campaigning reflects the low-level in-
volvement of a large portion of the digital party membership (174-176). 
Certainly, participation gaps in online communities are nothing new. Research on 
power-law distributions has demonstrated that the more a network grows in size the 
more the gap between a core group of hyper-active contributors and the vast majority 
of participants tends to increase (Barabási 2003; Shirky 2008). From an IPD perspective, 
however, such gap is problematic insofar as digital parties claim to empower the rank 
and file against oligarchic and vocational conceptions of party politics (Michels 1911; 
Weber 1946). In other words, as Gerbaudo admits, there exists a veritable gap be-
tween what digital parties promise to deliver and what they actually deliver at the level 
of IPD (186). Gerbaudo attributes this gap to utopian expectations about both the de-
mocratizing potential of the Internet and horizontal politics:  
 
By adopting the participationist utopia of leaderlessness and horizontalism, plat-
form parties run the risk of following an all too well-known course from idealism to 
cynicism. What is required is thus more transparency about the power retained by 
the leadership, while clarifying the degree to which the membership can actually 
have a say (187). 
  
At the root of this argument lies another argument about the centrality of charis-
matic leadership to the political success of all parties. According to Gerbaudo, charis-
matic leadership is “not necessarily anti-democratic” because “people need to identify 
themselves collectively, and they often do so by identifying with a leading individual” 
(185). Thus platform parties should grapple with this basic fact and set aside unrealistic 
expectations about the democratizing capacities of the Internet. Differently put, 
whereas leadership is a necessary condition of any (successful) party, digital participa-
tion is not, as demonstrated by the meteoric rise and fall of early digital parties such as 
the Pirate Parties of Sweden and Germany. 
Whereas Gerbaudo recognizes a pioneering role to the Pirates, he also downplays 
their significance on the ground that they have not been successful in translating their 
techno-utopian vision into electoral results (9). The second wave of digital parties such 
as 5SM, Podemos and France Insoumise have forged instead a “hybrid party type,” 
which combines “an agile directive structure and an active militant basis,” (78) with the 
clear goal of winning the elections. The consequence of this theoretical move, howev-
er, is twofold. First, by identifying the digital party with the second wave of digital par-
ties, Gerbaudo develops a party model that flattens the organizational differences that 
exist within digital parties. Second, this party model is much less innovative and 
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groundbreaking than it pretends to be. As we will see in the next section, the centraliz-
ing features of the platform party place it on a continuum with previous party models 
along several dimensions.  
 
 
4. The Continuity Between the Digital Party and Previous Party Models 
  
To begin with, Gerbaudo’s claim that digital parties would epitomize a trend toward 
a re-birth or return of the party form seems overblown. This is due to the relatively 
small size of the digital parties’ membership, which ranges between the 115.372 de-
clared members of the 5SM (Blog delle Stelle 2019), 524.672 members of Podemos 
(Participa Podemos 2020) and the 540.000 supporters of France Insoumise (France 2 
2017).2 Because these numbers do not even approach the membership size of the 
mass parties of the mid-twentieth century, they cannot be taken as indicators of a 
structural reversal in the long-term decline of mass membership organization. Further, 
the free membership model raises questions on the actual commitment of members 
who are not required to pay annual dues and frequently abstain from participating in 
the consultations, as evidenced by research on the declining voter turnout in Rousseau 
and Participa Podemos (Mosca 2018; Deseriis and Vittori 2019). To be sure, Gerbaudo 
recognizes that “for the great majority of members, participation is very low and infre-
quent and mostly of a purely reactive kind” (176). However, he presents this type of 
reactive participation as a distinctive feature of the digital party rather than as the con-
tinuation of a trend that begun in the previous century, when television was still the 
centerpiece of the media system.  
The shift from voting as an expression of collective belonging to a social group to 
voting as atomized expression of an “audience which responds to the terms that have 
been presented on the political stage” is well described by Bernard Manin in The Prin-
ciples of Representative Democracy (1997: 223). Manin argues that while in the age of 
party democracy political parties transposed on the electoral arena salient and lasting 
social cleavages, the multiplication of cleavages in mature democracies afford politi-
cians more freedom in choosing how to position themselves in the political arena. “In 
such a situation, the initiative of the terms of electoral choice belongs to the politician 
and not to the electorate, which explains why voting decisions appear primarily today 
 
2 Whereas the 5SM and Podemos require perspective members to upload a scanned 
copy of a valid ID, registration with France Insoumise only requires name and email ad-
dress.   
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as reactive” (223).  Further, in what Manin terms audience democracy, candidates take 
advantage of media exposure to “communicate directly with their constituents without 
the mediation of a party network” (220). Thus, as Katz and Dyan (1992) argued in their 
theory of media events, disintermediation is a phenomenon that long precedes the In-
ternet insofar as political entrepreneurs who are skilled at playing the language-game 
of television can cut a whole range of intermediaries and shape the party organizations 
they are meant to represent in their own image rather than the other way around. 
Brought to an extreme, this process of autonomization of the leader from the party 
leads to Forza Italia, a “television party,” to borrow Gerbaudo’s effective definition, 
that was modeled on and for Silvio Berlusconi’s image. Within the framework of the 
television party, the audience is purely reactive in that its (political) opinion and orien-
tations are monitored via TV ratings and telephone surveys, which function de facto as 
early cybernetic apparatuses. Indeed, in the same way as leaders of TV parties adjust 
their messaging on the basis of data collected and analyzed by pollsters and political 
consultants, so do party leaders in the digital age fine-tune their messages on the basis 
of data collected and analyzed by data analysts and digital strategists.  
From this angle, one could observe that among the seven features of the digital par-
ty identified by Gerbaudo at least five of them make their appearance in the television 
age: the charismatic leader, the reactive party base, the dematerialization of the party 
infrastructure, the elimination of intermediary bodies, and the direct consultations of 
the membership are all processes that begun well before the rise of digital parties. 
First, as noted, parties that prosper in the television age are led by highly mediatized 
and telegenic leaders. Gerbaudo borrows the term hyperleader from a debate between 
two of the co-founders of Podemos, Íñigo Errejón and German Cano, who “discussed 
the idea of hyperleadership as a strategy to create a new political identity” emanating 
from a group of intellectuals who “had very limited territorial penetration” (149). Men-
tioning the little-known anecdote that Pablo Iglesias’s decision to become the talk-
show host of the alternative TV program La Tuerka was inspired by the political success 
of Berlusconi, Gerbaudo notes that Podemos’ choice to invest in the telegenic leader-
ship of Iglesias was dictated by the need of creating a highly visible party in a short pe-
riod of time (149-50). Thus, whereas the term hyperleader refers to the mode of circu-
lation of the leader’s image—which is Internet-based rather than TV-based—the pro-
duction of the hyperleader presupposes the selection of an individual who possesses 
the same charismatic qualities and capacity to perform before an audience of the lead-
ers of the television age. 
Second, it is true that the hyperleader “navigates the nooks and crannies of a hybrid 
media system in which TV videos are shared and wildly commented on in social media” 
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(150). And it is also true that party members and supporters are often mobilized online 
precisely for this purpose. But as we have seen what characterizes digital parties is not 
online campaigning but the use of participation platforms for internal decision-making 
and organizing. And yet it is precisely on this level that the superbase seems to coa-
lesce almost exclusively to respond to stimuli coming from above, mirroring at the in-
tra-party level the reactive dimension of voting decisions in the age of audience de-
mocracy. Such observation is corroborated by data showing that participation in online 
consultations peaks when digital party members are called to express votes of confi-
dence in the party leadership and bottoms when members express themselves on the 
party program (Deseriis and Vittori 2019). In this respect, the individualized relation-
ship between the hyperleader and the atomized member of the superbase mirrors the 
charismatic relationship between the leader of the television party and the TV audi-
ence. 
Third, Gerbaudo acutely observes that digital parties dispose of national headquar-
ters because they are both costly to maintain and “symbolize [the] opacity and secre-
cy” of professionalized politics (96). This is certainly true but the dematerialization and 
delocalization of the party’s infrastructure are by no means exclusive to the digital par-
ty. In fact, these processes also begun with the television party and, more in general, 
with the spectacularization and mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). 
Indeed, the multiplication of media channels in the last quarter of the twentieth centu-
ry has had a double effect. First, it has increasingly shifted the setting of party elite’s 
performances from party headquarters and party branches to TV studios. Second, it 
has progressively reduced the importance of parties’ territorial organizations as evi-
denced by the generalized decline in European party membership since 1970 (Scarrow, 
2000; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke, 2012). From this angle, the dematerialization of 
the party infrastructure cannot be attributed entirely to digital party’s ideological hos-
tility toward bureaucracy (Gerbaudo, 96). Rather, it is an historical process that long 
predates the rise of digital parties. 
Similarly, and this is the fourth point, the demise of intermediary bodies is also an 
historical process that goes hand in hand with the steady personalization of politics, 
which is conducive to centralized organizations with weak presence on the ground (Cal-
ise 2007; Cross, Katz, and Pruysers 2018). Further, beginning in the 1980s, parties ra-
tionalized organizational costs primarily for financial reasons, increasingly relying on 
state subventions to compensate for revenue losses from membership fees. The well-
known cartel party thesis argues that the growing importance of state subsidies to par-
ty finances pushed parties to relax their ties with society (Katz and Mair 1995 and 
2009). Further, cartelization tilts the power balance between the three faces of party 
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organizations in favor of the party in public office (PPO) vis-à-vis the party in central of-
fice (PCO) and the party on the ground (POG). In the early 1990s, Katz and Mair also 
speculated that in order to consolidate its autonomy from the POG and the PCO, the 
PPO may “build up its own independent resources and bureaucracy” (1993: 609). Data 
showing a significant expansion of the parliamentary staff in European parties between 
1970 and 2010 have validated this hypothesis (Bardi, Calossi, and Pizzimenti 2017). But 
if that is the case, then the impact of platformization on party organizations should be 
assessed against the backdrop of the growing autonomization of the PPO on the one 
hand and the rise of personalist parties on the other hand. This means that “disinter-
mediation” is not so much an effect of political parties’ adoption of digital technolo-
gies. Rather, disintermediation was already at work within parties whose thinning 
membership base and growing mediatization of the leadership reduced the need for po-
litical intermediation.  
From this point of view, and this is the fifth continuity, it is no accident that several 
European parties begun holding direct consultations of the general membership via 
postal ballots already in the 1980s (Katz and Mair 1994: 16-17). In noting the paradox 
of parties that ostensibly democratized internal decision-making “while at the same 
time affording more autonomy to the party in public office” Katz and Mair observed 
that the introduction of postal ballots for candidate selection extended 
  
the process of intra-party democratization. . . to the members as individuals ra-
ther than to what might be called the organized  party on the ground. In other 
words, it is not the party congress or the middle-level elite, or the activists, who 
are being empowered, but rather the ‘ordinary’ members, who are at once more 
docile and more likely to endorse the policies (and candidates) proposed by the 
party leadership and by the party in public office. . . a process which is facilitated 
by the increasing use of centralized registers of party members (1994: 17). 
  
Because electronic databases and the Internet have lowered the marginal costs of 
consulting members, platform parties can now consult members more frequently and 
on a broader set of issues than their counterparts of the 1980s. However, because par-
ticipation platforms are strictly controlled by the PCO the outcome of the consultations 
is often plebiscitarian and tends to reinforce the position of the party leadership (Dese-
riis and Vittori 2019; Gerbaudo 2019). From this angle, not only does the introduction 
of participation platforms weakens the POG but it also provides the PCO with a critical 
resource tool to counterbalance the growing autonomization of the PPO. This is partic-
ularly evident in the 5SM, which requires elected MPs to pay a monthly allowance for 
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the funding of the Rousseau platform. (Podemos retains instead traditional ruling or-
ganisms of Leftist parties, which points to a more robust institutional role of the PCO). 
In sum, these considerations on the continuity between the platform party and pre-
vious party models raise the question on whether the platform party really is a new 
type of party. The answer to this question should be in my view twofold. From a strictly 
procedural standpoint, there is no doubt that platform parties present several discon-
tinuities with previous party models. Indeed, Podemos, 5SM, and France Insoumise 
have introduced in their statute direct democracy instruments that are virtually absent 
from the statutes of traditional parties. But if we take a substantive approach, overall 
these procedural innovations have had a modest impact on the quality of IPD, reinforc-
ing instead a trend toward centralization that characterized the mediatized and per-
sonalist parties of the television age. From this point of view, Gerbaudo’s digital party 
is a development in the history of party organizations whose degree of innovation is 
much less significant than it pretends to be.  
 
  
5. The Second Variant of the Digital Party: The Networked Party 
   
And yet in recent years we have also witnessed the emergence of a truly innovative 
model of party organization, which I would term the networked party. Although net-
worked parties such as the X Party and Barcelona en Comú in Spain, and the Pirate Par-
ties of Sweden, Germany, Iceland and Czechia (to mention the most successful Europe-
an chapters of the Pirate Parties International) have not achieved the same electoral 
success as platform parties, they have introduced significant organizational innova-
tions, which leverage the decentralized and cost-abating logic of the Internet to im-
plement an ideal party type characterized by a low degree of institutionalization 
(Panebianco 1982) and a strong anti-oligarchic tendency. Mirroring Gerbaudo’s seven 
theses, I will argue that the emerging organization of the networked party can be di-
vided into seven organizational principles: non-exclusive membership, decentralization, 
leadership function, bottom-up division of labor, collective agenda setting, hybrid par-
ticipation, and scalable deliberation (table 1). 
Not unlike platform parties, networked parties make an intensive use of participa-
tion platforms such as LiquidFeedback (Piratenpartei), Decidim (Barcelona en Comú) 
and X.Piratar (Icelandic Pirate Party) for internal decision making as well as collabora-
tive software such as etherpads and wikis (X Party). As compared to those used by plat-
form parties, these platforms embed deliberative features such as the possibility for 
members to discuss and revise proposals, gather endorsements, and delegate their 
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vote to other users. Further these platforms are often used in conjunction with and as 
an extension of offline meetings and assemblies. In this respect, networked parties 
emerge from the convergence and collaboration of two distinct social groups: infor-
mation technology activists, hackers and geeks on the one hand; and social movement 
activists on the other hand.   
 
Table 1. Comparison between the seven features of networked parties and platform parties. 
 
Platform Party Networked Party 
Membership growth Non-exclusive membership 
Delocalization Decentralization 
Hyperleadership Leadership function 
Superbase Bottom-up division of labor 
Plebiscitarianism Collective agenda setting 
Disintermediation Hybrid participation 
Distributed centralization Scalable deliberation 
 
The former group has played a prominent role in shaping the internal organization of 
networked parties such as the Swedish Piratepartiet and the German Piratenpartei, 
which were were initially focused on digital rights such as privacy protection, copyright 
reform, and an uncensored Internet. The latter group has played a key role in the 
foundation of Barcelona en Comú (from now on, BeC) and the X Party, two parties with 
strong ties to the indignados movement. It important to underscore, however, that 
these two groups frequently overlap. For example, the Swedish and the German Pirate 
Parties grew their membership base by spearheading two social movement campaigns 
for copyright reform and against government censorship, respectively (Bukart 2014; 
Deseriis 2019). Conversely, not only has the X Party built its internal organization upon 
ethical and operating principles of geek culture such as meritocracy and collaboration, 
but it also has provided digital know-how to the networked organization of BeC 
(Calleja-Lopez 2017).  
Further, one of the main distinguishing features of networked parties such as the Pi-
ratenpartei, X Party and BeC is that they seem to entertain a non-hegemonic relation-
ship with social movements, as evidenced by the first two organizational principles of 
networked parties: non-exclusive membership and decentralization. Because member-
ship in networked parties is not incompatible with membership in other parties and 
civil society organizations, networked parties often function as coordinating hubs for 
initiatives and campaigns that emerge from the civil society. Thus the Piratenpartei sig-
nificantly expanded its membership base after playing a key role in coordinating the 
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2009 #zensursula campaign against Internet filtering (Deseriis 2019); the X Party was 
founded by 15M activists who had previously designed and coordinated #MPRato, a 
citizen campaign to bring to court former CEO of Bankia Rodrigo Rato (Postill 2018); 
and BeC was founded and led by Ada Colau, charismatic leader of the PAH, a grassroots 
solidarity initiative for people affected by foreclosures (Russo Spena and Forti 2016).3  
To be sure, double affiliations and networked collaboration do not automatically 
translate in horizontal and egalitarian relationships. On the contrary, as noted, re-
search on power-law distributions has demonstrated that networks may harbor strong 
inequalities. However, because networked parties tend to be meritocratic and thus to 
reward voluntary work (Calleja-Lopez, 2017: 246-48) leadership selection in networked 
parties works quite differently from leadership selection in platform parties. This is the 
third point of contrast between the two variants of the digital party. Whereas the plat-
form party is a leader-centered or “leaderist” party, the networked party is, on an ideal 
party level, a leaderless organization (Deseriis 2017). More precisely, the networked 
party is a polycentric organization wherein individuals can easily assume a leading 
role—or a leadership function—on the basis of the work they contribute in their area of 
interest or expertise. To be sure, all parties functionally differentiate tasks, putting in a 
position of responsibility those who are more adept to fulfill certain roles. But while in 
traditional parties the party elite exerts political control over the internal division of la-
bor, distributing incentives and rewards as part of the career system (Michels 1911; 
Panebianco 1982), the networked party reduces the level of professionalization to a 
minimum, allowing leaders to emerge on the basis of their own contributions rather 
than of their affiliation to a power clique. 
This is particularly evident in LiquidFeedback (LQFB), the participation platform 
adopted by the German Pirates in 2010 to introduce, discuss and approve policy initia-
tives. Because LQFB allows participants to transfer delegations to other users for a spe-
cific initiative, topic area or any issue, it supports an internal division of labor that is 
more granular and less formalized than the division of labor based on top-down ap-
pointments. Further, this bottom-up division of labor—the fourth defining feature of 
the networked party—dovetails with the leadership function in that it can relieve high-
ly visible party figures from the burden of having to shape the party strategy and policy 
proposals. As we will see in the next section, in the same way as the concept of hyper-
 
3 Even though charismatic leadership runs counter the decentralized structure of the 
networked party BeC combines a mediatized front end centered around the figure of 
Barcelona’s mayor with a decentralized back end which retains many organizational 
features of the 15-M movement (Aragón et al. 2017; Toret 2015). 
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leadership in platform parties can be traced to the charismatic leadership of the televi-
sion age, the origins of the leadership function can be traced to the attempts made by 
the German Greens in the 1980s to decouple leadership from individual personalities 
and manage it in a collective fashion. 
 
 
6. From Basisdemokratie to Networked Self-Government 
 
In a prescient book published over a decade ago, Clay Shirky (2008) argues that in 
reducing the costs of publishing and of coordinating group activity the social web dis-
rupts the media industries and related professional institutions. According to Shirky, 
the collapsing costs of publishing and coordination of the workforce have given non-
professionals a growing capacity to produce and distribute content and services whose 
quality is sufficiently high to compete with the content and services produced by pro-
fessional institutions. This “mass amateurization” of formerly professionalized activities 
can also be extended to politics. From this angle, digital parties express the capacity of 
ordinary citizens to self-organize and challenge traditional parties’ hold onto “the mo-
nopoly of representation” (Bourdieu 1991).  
At the same time, the de-professionalization or amateurization of politics cannot be 
entirely attributed to the social web. In the 1980s, the German Greens tried to democ-
ratize institutional representation by introducing into party politics a set of organiza-
tional principles known as Basisdemokratie, which they borrowed from environmental 
and grassroots social movements. Such principles included collective leadership, strict 
separation of office and mandate, limited terms and rotation, effective control of all 
office and mandate holders by the rank-and-file, member access to meetings on all 
levels, and full political autonomy of the local organizations from the party executive 
(Poguntke 1993: 137-143). Although in the 1990s the structural constraints of the par-
liamentary system induced the Greens to “sacrifice some of their participatory ideals to 
the creation of a more efficient organizational structure,” Basisdemokratie remained a 
point of reference for the movement parties of the following decades (Kitschelt 2006; 
Della Porta et al. 2017).  
Thus, when it was founded in 2006, the Piratenpartei adopted some of these princi-
ples allowing for example all members to attend party conventions with voting power. 
Whereas this model was viable in the first three years, in 2009 the party saw a tenfold 
increase in its membership base as a result of a successful campaign for Internet free-
dom (Deseriis 2019). This unexpected growth, however, raised the problem of how to 
manage party conventions with thousands of participants all of whom had equal power 
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to make policy proposals, amend them, and vote them on. With meetings dragging for 
days and failing to come to a conclusion (Postill 2018: 148), the Pirates searched for an 
effective decision-making tool that could scale participation without incurring in the 
democratic deficits typical of large-scale assemblies on the one hand and of oligarchic 
party cliques on the other hand. Released in late 2009, LQFB was initially designed to 
meet both needs. As we have seen, the transitive delegation feature of LQFB allows 
participants to receive proxy votes and transfer them in turn to other participants 
based on their expertise. This reversible (or liquid) system of delegations has two major 
consequences. First, as noted, it puts the internal division of labor into the hands of or-
dinary members, weakening the capacity of the party elite to distribute incentives and 
rewards. Second, because proposals have to pass an initial quorum, it allows the rank-
and-file—in particular those members who hold many delegations—to exert control 
over the party agenda.  
To be sure, with the exception of the Berlin branch, the Piratenpartei did not make a 
binding use of LQFB and conflicts erupted between the Berlin branch and the Bavarian 
branch of the party over the contentious proposal to transform LQFB into the equiva-
lent of a permanent party convention (Deseriis 2019). Notwithstanding this particular 
case, however, it is clear that on an ideal party level networked parties allow their 
members to engage in collective agenda-setting, a feature which also stands in striking 
contrast with the centralized agenda-setting of platform parties. Here it is important to 
underscore that the party-network’s capacity to set the agenda from below is a process 
that does not exclusively occur online. This is clear in the case of BeC, whose 2014 
“electoral program was drawn up by over 5000 people, with contributions made in 
open assemblies and online” (Shea Baird 2015). And it is also clear in the case of the 
Berlin Pirate Party, which made use of LQFB to assemble, amend and approve policy 
proposals that had been previously drafted offline by working groups and individuals.  
In this respect, and this is the sixth feature, the networked party balances out the 
dematerialization of the party infrastructure with a hybrid participation process that 
combines offline deliberation with online decision-making. These two layers fulfill two 
essential and complementary aspects of any democratic process: trust and political 
equality. Offline meetings lay in fact the foundations for participants to trust each oth-
er and work together, a process epitomized by the neighborhood assemblies of BeC 
(Zelinka 2018). At the same time, the online process allows participants to acquire a 
holistic view of the proposals coming from different quarters of the party and exercise 
their voting rights at the decisive stage of the decision-making process (Dahl 1989). For 
example, BeC developed its program as a three-stage process: the proposals that 
emerged from the neighborhood assemblies were first amended via the Participa por-
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tal and then subjected to a final vote online (Russo Spena and Forti 2016: 92). In this 
way, hybrid participation combines offline deliberation with online preference aggre-
gation to produce a multimodal process whose overall quality is certainly higher than 
the plebiscitarian consultations of platform parties. To be sure, platform party activists 
also meet offline. But such meetings usually do not have an impact beyond the local 
level, and thus do not affect the national agenda, which remains firmly in the hands of 
the party elite. This is evident from the fact that the 5SM activist groups cannot under-
take regional or national initiatives via the Rousseau platform and that no member-
sponsored initiatives in Participa Podemos have ever reached a quorum to be turned 
into binding referendums (Deseriis and Vittori 2019).  
Certainly the question of how to scale deliberation from the local to the national 
level also concerns networked parties. Both the Piratenpartei and the X Party faced in 
fact various challenges when they tried to scale collaboration and deliberation beyond 
Berlin and Barcelona, respectively (Deseriis 2019; Calleja-Lopez 2017). Indeed software 
such as LQFB and Decidim have been designed precisely to scale deliberation beyond 
overcrowded party conventions and neighborhood assemblies, respectively. But a veri-
table gap persists between what deliberative software can afford and what networked 
parties are actually capable of implementing. Of course, not unlike platform parties, 
networked parties remain partisan organizations that compete in the electoral arena 
and have to maintain a recognizable political line. In this sense, the assessment of the 
scope, quality and impact of networked deliberation on a digital party’s political line 
cannot overlook the systemic constraints of inter-party politics and of the hegemonic 
nature of electoral politics. At the same time, on an ideal-party level, scalable delibera-
tion remains a defining, if experimental, feature of networked parties insofar as it aims 
at overcoming the limitations of small-scale deliberation in local meetings of activists 
on the one hand and of party elites on the other hand.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have argued that although all digital parties share certain ideological 
features such as the emphasis on participation of the rank and file and the use of par-
ticipation platforms for internal decision making, these two variants of the digital party 
present significant differences in organizational terms. The platform party presents in 
fact a high degree of centralization, which is epitomized by four distinctive features 
identified by Gerbaudo: hyperleadership, reactive superbase, decline of intermediary 
cadres and plebiscitarian character of the consultations. In Gerbaudo’s analysis these 
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centralizing features mitigate the risk that the lowering costs of participation—
epitomized by the free membership model—may yield a weak party identity and an in-
coherent political line. On an organizational level, however, the platform party ends up 
presenting several continuities with previous party models such as the cartel party and 
the personalist parties of the television age, which had already cultivated passive and 
reactive modes of participation. 
In contrast, by combining social movement practices with deliberative and collabo-
rative software, networked parties advance a model of digital party that leverages the 
decentralized affordances of the Internet to make the party line (and the relative divi-
sion of labor) emerge from the network itself. This does not mean that leaders are ab-
sent from networked parties. Rather, the networked party selects its leaders more for 
their capacity to execute specific tasks within the party, than for their charisma or ca-
pacity to win internal power struggles. The coexistence of several leadership-functions 
(organizational, symbolic, policy-oriented, and so on), however, leaves unattended the 
question of how the networked party is to shape its identity. Perhaps herein lies the 
main contradiction of networked parties: whereas the network form is by its very na-
ture flexible, open ended, and receptive to the inputs that come from the social body, 
the party form is hierarchical, structured, partisan, and thus less permeable to the het-
erogeneity of the social. Whereas platform parties have solved this tension by delegat-
ing to their leaders the task of symbolizing the unity of the party, networked parties 
have bet on the capacity of networks to display emergent and self-organizing proper-
ties.  
But as we have seen, a key feature of the networked party—the scalability of delib-
eration—remains at this stage experimental. In this sense, the networked party is an 
ideal party form, which is far less structured and defined than the platform party. At 
the same time, we should resist the temptation of casting these two variants of the 
digital party as an alternative between political realism and political idealism. The re-
cent electoral setbacks of the 5SM, France Insoumise, Podemos and Labour Party—the 
four cases analyzed by Gerbaudo—suggest in fact that platform parties may have ex-
hausted their capacity to capitalize on the participatory demands emerging from the 
social movements of the past decade. On the other hand, networked parties can be-
come a viable party model only if they are capable to reconcile democratic participa-
tion with a model of (collective) leadership that can hold together the many nodes and 
functions of the party network. For this reason, the networked party and the digital 
party are best understood as two different but related outcomes of the crisis of the 
party form on the one hand and of the new opportunities offered by the lowering costs 
of digital participation on the other hand.  
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